Espen Storli

2020 Charlotte, North Carolina

Abstract: Standard Oil was a quintessential American company. By 1900 it was the largest industrial enterprise in the United States, a position that had been achieved not the least through inventive strategies towards collaboration and competition (for instance through the creation of the corporate trust form). The company heavily influenced business practices in the US, but through its heavy-handed operations it also provoked public outcry and ultimately political response. This US story is well known. Yet, Standard Oil had by the end of the 19th century become a global company which was as dominant overseas as it was at home. Consequently, its operations affected business life all over the world, not just in the US, and it was not just in the US that the company was publically debated or encountered political response. The aim of this paper is to study the operations of Standard Oil in Europe and the public and political response that the company encountered in the different states of the continent. The paper will focus on the period from the last part of the 19th century, when Standard Oil built up a network of subsidiary companies in most countries in Europe, and until around 1930. The paper is based on access to original source material from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the US (papers from Standard Oil subsidiaries, from the ExxonMobile collection, government sources), in addition to the existing secondary literature from a number of countries in Europe. Employing a comparative perspective, the paper will investigate the following main research questions: how did Standard Oil achieve market dominance in the different European countries, and what kind of public and political responses did the market power of the company trigger in Europe?

2022 Mexico City

Abstract: The emergence of cartels and trusts towards the end of the 19th century gradually forced political authorities all over the world to think hard and deep about how markets ought to operate. The private regulation of economic actors often led to concentration of market power, to the possibility to squeeze smaller competitors, and the ability to wring monopoly profits from customers and consumers. Private regulation measures were therefore slowly met with political regulation in different parts of the world, and in the process, the regulatory scope of states was significantly expanded. Concentration in industry thus led to growing state intervention in the economy. This paper analyses how a small state responded to the growing dominance of international cartels and trusts in the first half of the 20th century. The article asks two main research questions. First, which economic tools did the Norwegian authorities utilize to confront the market power of international cartels and trusts, and second, what was the effect of the policies on the operations of these large economic entities in Norway? In the first part of the paper we discuss the different regulatory tools which the Norwegian political authorities had at hand to respond to the perceived threat of cartelization. In the second part, we discuss how these tools were employed in arguably the three most significant trust-cases in this period of Norwegian history; namely the actions against British-American Tobacco Company, Standard Oil and Unilever. The way that the political authorities responded to these three trusts was not only important in each specific case but would also have significant implications for the development of the more general framework of anti-competitive regulation in Norway. Since these giant trusts were perceived as a challenge, both to the interests of Norwegian consumers as well as to Norwegian producers, they set in motion debates which lasted for years, and which would result in significant regulatory expansion.

2023 Detroit, MI, United States

Abstract: In the summer of 1967 representatives from Zambia, Chile, Peru and the Congo met in Lusaka, Zambia to discuss the future of the copper industry. The four countries accounted for 80% of world copper exports, and their economies were all highly dependent on the metal. Inspired by OPEC, the countries wanted to establish a similar kind of organization to regulate the markets in order to stabilize national revenue, and soon they set up CIPEC: the organization of copper-exporting countries. From the outset, the producer countries had high hopes, but while OPEC would go on to have significant impact on the world oil markets, CIPEC’s attempts would flounder, and the organization would gradually become irrelevant, eventually being disbanded in the 1990s. Although eventually unsuccessful, CIPEC is an important example of south-south collaboration and in its early years it was considered both hugely inspirational (by other countries in the Global South) and as a potential threat to the international economic order (by the copper-importing countries). The aim of this paper is to analyze the early history of CIPEC with a special focus on the relationship between the two main drivers behind the establishment of the organization, the governments of Chile and Zambia, and the main international copper companies, most significantly Anglo-American and RST. The paper asks three main questions: why was CIPEC established, how did the collaboration evolve over time, and what impact did the large multinational copper companies have on the organization? The paper is based on access to original source material from government archives in Zambia and Chile, in addition to company records of Anglo-American and RST.

2024 Providence, Rhode Island

Abstract: The question of how prices are set is fundamental to business history. For natural resources there has been four major different pricing systems: producer price lists, commodity exchanges, through the medium of a reputable, independent source such as trade journals which make market surveys to discover actual transaction prices and then publish them at regular time intervals, or through prices negotiated directly between seller and buyer. Historically these have often functioned at different times in different markets, but often two of the systems function for a commodity at the same time. In extreme cases, even all four of them might have been in action at the same time. According to economic thought, the choice of pricing mechanisms for a commodity depends on structural factors within an industry. However, the existing theories of structural factors is challenged by the existence of several pricing mechanisms for similar natural resources at the same time. Neither can the structural theories explain why the structure of an industry can change without that being automatically connected to changes in pricing systems. This paper analyses the development of pricing systems for natural resources from the start of the second global economy to today. The main research question is why have different natural resources been priced according to different systems? How have these pricing systems changed over time, and which actors have been instrumental in changing them? The paper will be based on extensive analysis of existing research, as well as primary research into a selection of natural resources. The paper will deal with both soft and hard commodities.

2025 Atlanta, Georgia

Abstract: In the 1890s and early 1900s, Standard Oil secured a monopoly or a near-monopoly in the Scandinavian markets. This also included the small, but rapidly growing, Icelandic market which was controlled by Standard Oil’s Danish subsidiary DDPA. As in the rest of Scandinavia, Iceland had long and dark winters. Kerosene therefore became an important product. After 1900, petroleum motors also helped transform Iceland’s fisheries. Oil products were therefore essential for the country’s economy. However, politics helped complicate Standard Oil’s position in Iceland. Iceland was at this point a Danish dependency. While Iceland gained limited home rule in 1874, Icelandic patriots called for increased domestic influence over the country’s development. This also affected the political economy and oil market. Standard Oil met stronger resistance in Iceland than in the other Scandinavian countries. It met sharp criticism for its abuse of market power. In 1914, just before the outbreak of war, the Icelandic fishermens’ movement started importing petroleum. By 1916, Iceland’s government did likewise. In the early 1920s, the government organized a state monopoly for petroleum. We have so far limited information about this monopoly, but it was probably not economically successful. In 1925, Iceland again allowed independent companies to import and sell petroleum. However, the state oil company continued to operate, with the explicit aim to limit the international oil companies’ potential abuse of monopoly power. The aim of this paper is to investigate the political economy of oil in Iceland: how important was Standard Oil to the development of the Icelandic economy, why did the company meet so fierce resistance, and how effective was the state petroleum monopoly? The paper is based on access to original source material from the archives of Standard Oil’s Danish subsidiary.

2026 London

Abstract: Aluminium is frequently characterised as the “green metal”. It is the most recyclable of all industrial materials, and it can be recycled over and over again, with very little loss of its properties. In the words of European Aluminium, the industry organization of European aluminium producers, aluminium is a sustainable material and “a unique metal driving the green transition.” However, the production of aluminium in itself does not come without negative local environmental impacts. This was evident already from the birth of the modern aluminium industry in the last decade of the 19th century. The aluminium smelting process led to significant emissions of fluoride waste. As a consequence, immediately after the first aluminium smelters started operating, nearby vegetation was damaged. Soon it became apparent that the emissions also negatively impacted the health of the workers in the smelters. Thus, from the start of the industry, the question of how to deal with the harmful effects of aluminium smelting on local environments became an important political, technological, and societal issue. The aim of this paper is to analyse how three different aluminium producing countries in Europe dealt with this issue. Switzerland and the UK were pioneers in the industry and had operating smelters from the late 1880s/early 1890s, while the first smelter in Norway started operating in 1908. Throughout the 20th century, they continued to be significant aluminium producing countries. How did these different states tackle industrial pollution from the aluminium industry, and how did the environmental policies change over time? Based on original source material from all three countries, both from industry and government sources, the issue is analysed through a comparative and international framework.