Papers presented by Espen Storli since 2019
2024 Providence, Rhode Island
"The Historical Development of Price-setting Mechanisms for Natural Resources"
Espen Storli, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Abstract:
The question of how prices are set is fundamental to business history. For natural resources there has been four major different pricing systems: producer price lists, commodity exchanges, through the medium of a reputable, independent source such as trade journals which make market surveys to discover actual transaction prices and then publish them at regular time intervals, or through prices negotiated directly between seller and buyer. Historically these have often functioned at different times in different markets, but often two of the systems function for a commodity at the same time. In extreme cases, even all four of them might have been in action at the same time. According to economic thought, the choice of pricing mechanisms for a commodity depends on structural factors within an industry. However, the existing theories of structural factors is challenged by the existence of several pricing mechanisms for similar natural resources at the same time. Neither can the structural theories explain why the structure of an industry can change without that being automatically connected to changes in pricing systems. This paper analyses the development of pricing systems for natural resources from the start of the second global economy to today. The main research question is why have different natural resources been priced according to different systems? How have these pricing systems changed over time, and which actors have been instrumental in changing them? The paper will be based on extensive analysis of existing research, as well as primary research into a selection of natural resources. The paper will deal with both soft and hard commodities.
2022 Mexico City
"Taming the Leviathans: How Norway Managed to Regulate the Strongest International Cartels and Trusts 1900-1940"
Espen Storli, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Pål Thonstad Sandvik, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Abstract:
The emergence of cartels and trusts towards the end of the 19th century gradually forced political authorities all over the world to think hard and deep about how markets ought to operate. The private regulation of economic actors often led to concentration of market power, to the possibility to squeeze smaller competitors, and the ability to wring monopoly profits from customers and consumers. Private regulation measures were therefore slowly met with political regulation in different parts of the world, and in the process, the regulatory scope of states was significantly expanded. Concentration in industry thus led to growing state intervention in the economy. This paper analyses how a small state responded to the growing dominance of international cartels and trusts in the first half of the 20th century. The article asks two main research questions. First, which economic tools did the Norwegian authorities utilize to confront the market power of international cartels and trusts, and second, what was the effect of the policies on the operations of these large economic entities in Norway? In the first part of the paper we discuss the different regulatory tools which the Norwegian political authorities had at hand to respond to the perceived threat of cartelization. In the second part, we discuss how these tools were employed in arguably the three most significant trust-cases in this period of Norwegian history; namely the actions against British-American Tobacco Company, Standard Oil and Unilever. The way that the political authorities responded to these three trusts was not only important in each specific case but would also have significant implications for the development of the more general framework of anti-competitive regulation in Norway. Since these giant trusts were perceived as a challenge, both to the interests of Norwegian consumers as well as to Norwegian producers, they set in motion debates which lasted for years, and which would result in significant regulatory expansion.
Keywords:
2020 Charlotte, North Carolina
"Standard Oil in Europe: European States and American Market Power, 1890-1930"
Pål Thonstad Sandvik, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Espen Storli, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Abstract:
Standard Oil was a quintessential American company. By 1900 it was the largest industrial enterprise in the United States, a position that had been achieved not the least through inventive strategies towards collaboration and competition (for instance through the creation of the corporate trust form). The company heavily influenced business practices in the US, but through its heavy-handed operations it also provoked public outcry and ultimately political response. This US story is well known. Yet, Standard Oil had by the end of the 19th century become a global company which was as dominant overseas as it was at home. Consequently, its operations affected business life all over the world, not just in the US, and it was not just in the US that the company was publically debated or encountered political response. The aim of this paper is to study the operations of Standard Oil in Europe and the public and political response that the company encountered in the different states of the continent. The paper will focus on the period from the last part of the 19th century, when Standard Oil built up a network of subsidiary companies in most countries in Europe, and until around 1930. The paper is based on access to original source material from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the US (papers from Standard Oil subsidiaries, from the ExxonMobile collection, government sources), in addition to the existing secondary literature from a number of countries in Europe. Employing a comparative perspective, the paper will investigate the following main research questions: how did Standard Oil achieve market dominance in the different European countries, and what kind of public and political responses did the market power of the company trigger in Europe?