Dissertations

KEEPING THE CORPORATE IMAGE: PUBLIC RELATIONS AND BUSINESS, 1900-1950

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The first problem facing the student of public relations is definitional. There have been scores, indeed hundreds, of attempts at a solution, none of them really satisfactory. The only important previous study of this field by a historian, Alan R. Raucher's useful book [6], opts to take public relations men at their word. That is to say, Raucher includes those who use the term to describe their activities but intentionally ignores people doing similar things without using the label. This has the virtue of simplicity but the defect of neglecting the more general phenomenon of "public relations mindedness" when it is not specifically denominated as such. This is an important point, for the growth of public relations is really the story of the transformation of the attitude of America's business leaders toward the role which public opinion should play in their enterprises. The student cannot avoid a company as conscious of its reputation as Ford on the grounds that it did not establish an official public relations department until rather late in its history.

If anything, it is more promising to veer in the opposite direction and try for an inclusive definition, although here too there are problems. Public relations can be taken to mean simply persuasion. Indeed, a disaffected counsellor once claimed that the earliest public relations men were the Sophists of ancient Greece, who for a fee would make the worse appear the better argument [3]. Taken in this general sense, it is easy to find harbingers of America's predominance in this vocation. Not long after the beginnings of English settlement in the New World, promoters were vigorously selling it to the Old. As the late Richard Hofstadter observed, America was born in one of the first great advertising campaigns in world history [5]. The prototypical public relations man from colonial times would no doubt have been Benjamin Franklin. His adeptness at creating images has often been commented upon and one of the avowed purposes of his autobiography was to "sell" America to England and to the world.

In the early 19th century, what Daniel J. Boorstin has called the *businessman Americanus*, the Booster, conducted himself in a way that modern public relations counsellors could appreciate. He based his career upon developing towns by selecting a site and then frantically trying to attract settlers, merchants, railroads, and so on. The success of his venture depended upon his ability to persuade others that it would succeed. His close ally was the newspaper editor who was not above "represent[ing] things that had not gone through the formality of taking place"[1].

As industry came of age following the Civil War, there were increasing indications of the respect big businessmen felt for public opinion and for the ability of the press to influence it. Newspapers "on the financial rocks," one historian has remarked [7], "had a way of drifting into portfolios of big-time investors, who recognized the utility of having press spokesmen on their side."

How can we differentiate 20th century public relations activity from that which florished in previous years? The usual way has been to assert that the modern businessman has been far more desirous of public approbation than the "public-be-damned" tycoon of yore. There is some truth to this observation but less than most might think. Of course the modern executive is concerned with public opinion, but it is easy to find predecessors, even in the most heroic days of American enterprise, who, like the Standard Oil man quoted by Ralph and Muriel Hidy [4], thirsted for "a place in the good will, honor and affection of honorable men."

The real change which took place in this century was organizational. Managers of large firms, which were easy targets for the expose journalism of the muckrakers, came to realize that public relations, as distinct from product advertising or free product publicity, merited systematic and respected treatment. Modern corporate public relations can thus be defined as the management of a corporation's image by *planned* and *organized* effort through informing and cultivating the media and through having the corporation itself alter its policies in accord with perceived public desires.

The firms which led in taking public relations seriously were American Telephone and Telegraph and the railroads, especially the Pennsylvania which early employed the man usually viewed as the vocation's founder, Ivy L. Lee. Lee's later work for the Rockefeller family is well known.

During the 1920s, the leading names in the field were Lee, Edward L. Bernays (another independent counsellor who is a nephew of Sigmund Freud), and Arthur W. Page at AT&T. Leading big businessmen, like others, had seen the power of propaganda during World War I, and they wanted to have it on their side. One does not, however, get the sense of urgency about public relations which one feels existed before the war.

That sense of urgency returned, however, and with a vengeance during the Great Depression. It was then, and especially in the mid- to late 1930s, that public relations became an object of passionate interest. The National Association of Manufacturers led in using it to counteract what it viewed as the Roosevelt Administration's antibusiness bias, and the association encouraged such member companies as Remington Rand in their propaganda efforts. Independent counseling firms, such as Carl Byoir and Associates and Hill and Knowlton, grew rapidly, thanks to clients who were having trouble with unions, such as the steel industry, or with regulation-minded legislators, such as A&P. At the same time other companies which were suffering a bad press, such as DuPont, concentrated on developing an internal public relations apparatus which did not depend on outside counsellors. AT&T continued its work in this direction under Page.

During World War II, one might have expected the emphasis on public relations to have declined. The national administration made efforts to conciliate formerly disaffected businessmen, who responded with loyal service. Despite this rapprochement, public relations continued to grow in importance. The reasons included fear that depression would return, the need to manage news because of military secrets, and concern lest some admittedly necessary wartime restrictions on private enterprise become permanent.

Following the war, surveys attest to the continued growth of the function. Inflation, labor troubles, and "foreign" ideologies overcame feelings of security which big businessmen might have entertained because of the general acceptance of the large firm.

Having summarized the narrative portion of this dissertation, there is space to mention only two of the more important questions which were asked of the material therein.

(1) Many scholars have noted a diminution in animosity toward big business during the first half of this century. According to Louis Galambos, the middle classes have come to accept the large firm as a legitimate component of the national polity [2]. How much have the millions of dollars that businesses have invested in public relations contributed to that change? The answer to this exceedingly complex question is, less than some liberal critics have charged and less than some executives have hoped. Nonetheless, it has been a factor in muting discontent with big business in general and with certain specific firms in particular which have been adept at its use.

(2) Have public relations counsellors really operated on the oft-spoken-of "Two-Way Street"? Have they affected business policy, or have they, more often than not, merely been called in to provide a smokescreen after corporate chicanery has been exposed? Are they merely 19th century press agents with higher paychecks? To make a complex matter brief, public relations men have done more than issue press releases. At their suggestion, manufacturers have cleaned up plants, railroads have installed high-quality glass in their

passenger cars, and all kinds of firms have increased communication with employees and entered into community activities. However, the reverse direction on the two-way street has always been rather lightly trod. There has often been a wide gap between public relations rhetoric and the realities of business conduct.

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THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE MINERAL RIGHTS: NEVADA'S COMSTOCK LODE

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Legal institutions are important. Their role in assigning resource ownership and in reducing uncertainty has received increased emphasis by economic historians in explaining variations in growth patterns and income distribution. Among those focusing on legal institutions are Douglass North and Robert P. Thomas [4], Harry Scheiber [5], Willard Hurst [3], and James Buchanan [1]. My dissertation builds on their work and examines the development of mineral rights law in the American West which guaranteed private control of ore deposits. Focus is placed on the progression of mining law from general, unwritten rules in the 1850s to highly defined statutes and court rulings by 1900. Central to the study is lobby activity by mineral rights claimants in obtaining legal change. To guide the analysis a model is presented which predicts the progression of mineral rights law by examining the net gain considerations of the miners. This is done to determine the incentives they would have for changing the legal structure. On the benefit side, greater precision in the law increases the probability that a prospector will maintain control of his claim, particularly if there is rising competition for the land due to ore strikes. Increased precision in the law, however, involves private costs. There are bargaining costs for agreement on resource use; lobby expenditures for influencing legislators, judges, and other enforcing officials; and taxes from government operations. The model requires that miners balance their marginal costs and benefits in seeking legal definition and enforcement of their claims. Three hypotheses follow from the model and are tested in the dissertation:

> Mineral rights law becomes more precisely defined and elaborately enforced as the value of mine output increases.
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> Once rights are strictly defined and supported, further increases in precision occur at a declining rate, even though output may continue to rise.
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> Increased definition and support of private mineral rights reduces risk and thereby encourages further mine investment and output.

The empirical test centers on the Comstock Lode from 1859-95 for two reasons: First, local Comstock mineral rights laws were given national significance when they were incorporated into the Federal Mining Statutes of 1866 and 1872 which legalized private claims to public minerals. Those laws are still in effect. Second, deep vein or lode mining, common throughout the West, was first extensively used on the Comstock Lode. Primary historical data was collected from the following sources: Virginia City, *Nevada Territorial Enterprise*; San Francisco, *Alta California*, and the *Mining and Scientific Press*; Sacramento *Bee*; annual reports of Comstock mine companies; and records of the Nevada Legislature and Supreme Court.

The research reveals the following progression of mining law and enforcement agencies: In 1858 before the rich ore strikes, the miners worked the area east of Lake Tahoe under unwritten, informal ownership agreements and produced $67,000 in bullion [6]. After the Comstock Lode was discovered the following year, mine output rose rapidly, attracting thousands of new prospectors. Evidence shows that the resulting intense competition for the limited ground led to the formation of local mining camp governments with *written* rules prescribing claim location procedures, claim sizes, conditions for maintaining mining rights, and arbitration procedures. As output continued to rise, these mining camps were replaced in 1861 and 1864 by the territorial and state governments as the major sources of mineral rights law. My dissertation analyzes the mining camp rules, legislative statutes, and court verdicts to show how they increased the security of private claims. The lobby efforts of the mining groups to obtain those statutes and verdicts are also described.

To trace clearly the nature of legal change for the period 1859-95, the Comstock's productive years, three numerical measures are presented. One is the annual number of mineral rights laws passed and related Supreme Court verdicts issued. The other two are indexes of the annual increase in precision of mining law and the cumulative level of refinement of the law. The construction of those indexes is outlined in the dissertation. The pattern of legal adjustment that emerges from these numerical measures suggests that both legislative and court activity was most intense from 1859-66, which was also the period of greatest uncertainty of claim ownership. By 1868 mineral rights were relatively secure; lobby activity by the mining interests for legal support of their holdings declined; and the number of statutes and court rulings dropped off. Regression analysis using the precision indexes as dependent variables and mine output and other economic data as independent variables supports these observations. The statistical tests indicate that the greatest changes in the specificity of mineral rights law occurred in the early years when rights were poorly defined and output was rising. After 1868 the pace of legal change fell rapidly as private rights became highly defined and enforced even though output continued to grow, reaching a high of $38 million in 1876 [2].

To test the third hypothesis, my dissertation examines the impact of the legal structure on mine investment. The behavior of mine company stock prices on the San Francisco Exchange was followed under the assumption that mineral rights legislation and verdicts would reduce risk, increasing the present value of share ownership, and thereby stock prices. Stock price indexes were constructed and statistical tests run, but the analysis showed no price reaction to changes in mineral laws. Research of more qualitative data in government and private mining reports also failed to show significant output effects from changes in mineral rights law. *Prior* legal guarantees, then, seem not to have been necessary to elicit mining investment. In fact, the analysis indicated that mine investors were confident of obtaining whatever legal institutions that were necessary to support their claims.

The findings of my dissertation, then, confirmed the first two hypotheses regarding the progression of mineral rights laws as output increased. The record, however, did not support the third hypothesis that further investment would be forthcoming after additional ownership guarantees were made. The study demonstrated the close relationship between legal and economic activities with ownership uncertainty as a major incentive for legal change.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

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The first life insurance organizations in the United States were formed in the latter years of the 18th century to assuage the economic distress of the widows and orphans of low-paid Presbyterian and Episcopalian ministers. The idea soon appealed to the secular community and by the early decades of the 19th century several companies had optimistically undertaken the business of insuring life. Legislatures were encouraging; special charters for the organization of the new companies were rapidly and eagerly granted by many states. Life insurance seemed the perfect solution for the increasing economic destitution of widows and orphans. The public, however, did not respond. Surprised and dismayed by their failure, many pioneering companies withdrew altogether or else turned to other business to compensate for their losses in life insurance. The contrasting success of savings banks and trust companies, as well as the prosperity of fire and marine insurance companies, attests to the fact that there was sufficient disposable income among the population at the beginning of the 19th century. In addition, the early companies offered a solid economic organization; no life insurance company failed before the 1850s. Epidemics and high mortality rates did not affect their stability; actuarial knowledge was sufficient to calculate adequate premium rates. Americans were offered sound policies which they needed and they could well afford. They did not, however, want them.

After the 1840s there was a drastic reversal of trends and life insurance began its fantastic history of financial success. Its sudden prosperity has puzzled insurance historians as much as the initial failure of the industry. The new companies were offering the same product; neither rates nor conditions of life insurance policies were significantly improved. The only major change was the adoption of aggressive marketing techniques. J. Owen Stalson [1] has argued persuasively that the "rags-to-riches" transformation of life insurance in midcentury can be unequivocally attributed to the employment of thousands of active, high-pressure salesmen. He never explains, however, why agents were so necessary when other types of insurance, such as marine or fire, sold with little effort. The struggles and the victories of life insurance have remained enigmatic and misunderstood because its historians systematically overlooked the nonmonetary factors involved in its acceptance and adoption.

In the first place, the development of the life insurance industry reflected the struggle between fundamentalist and modernist religious outlooks that worked itself out in the 19th century. The cultural incompatibility of life insurance with deterministic religious beliefs hindered its development. Life insurance was opposed as an ungodly arrangement which defied the role of Providence in regulating the social order. It was redeemed by emerging voluntaristic theological conceptions which allowed man a more active participatory role.

Life insurance was also subjected to the antagonism of a value system that condemned its materialistic assessment of human life. With life insurance, money and man, the sacred and the profane, were thrown together; the value of man became measurable by money. The financial evaluation of a man's life introduced by the industry was initially rejected by many as a profanation which transformed the sacred event of death into a vulgar commodity. By the latter part of the 19th century, the economic definition of the value of death became finally more acceptable, legitimating the life insurance enterprise. However, the monetary evaluation of death did not desacralize it; far from "profaning" life and death, money became sacralized by its association with them. Life insurance took on symbolic values quite distinct from its utilitarian function, emerging as a new form of ritual with which to face death and a processing of the dead by those kin left behind.

Another cultural factor explored in this dissertation is the impact of changing ideologies of risk and speculation. Much of the opposition to life insurance resulted from the apparently speculative nature of the enterprise; the insured were seen as "betting" with their lives against the company. As traditional economic morality was replaced with a different entrepreneurial ethos in the latter part of the 19th century, life insurance gained prominence and moral respectability.

The adoption of life insurance was influenced by cultural factors such as religious beliefs, values, and ideologies. Its pattern of diffusion demonstrates the limitations of an exclusively economic analysis of social behavior. Life insurance historians characteristically concentrate on economic determinants of the industry's development, overlooking as a consequence certain fundamental elements of the history external to the economic sphere. My study emphasizes the inadequacy and theoretical naivete of single-factor theories; I have stressed the importance of developing less simplistic multidimensional explanatory models. There is no assertion made that the vicissitudes of the life insurance business can be attributed to those cultural factors alone, or that economic and technological variables are irrelevant analytical tools. There is little doubt that the higher degree of economic development and the increased urbanization of midcentury America were necessary to the development of life insurance. They were not, however, sufficient for its adoption. The role of cultural factors was tested by comparisons between types of insurance in the United States and other countries, as well as by cross-cultural and over-time comparative analysis.

My study also takes into account selected social-structural variables, such as the strain in shifting a social practice from an altruistic type of exchange to a market exchange. The economic protection of widows and orphans, formerly the responsibility of kin and community, was not easily reduced to pure economics. The simultaneous goals of business and altruism created a structural source of ambivalence for the enterprise. An analysis of the changing marketing techniques used by life insurance companies during the 19th century shows their oscillating attempts to emphasize either commercial or altruistic goals. Agents were caught in the ambivalence, torn between a self-image as missionaries and a public image as greedy salesmen. The occupational status of life insurance agents can be seen to be an additional indicator of response to the industry. The concept of "dirty work" is utilized to analyze the role characteristics and low occupational prestige of life agents.

The data for this dissertation were obtained from a qualitative analysis of a wide spectrum of historical documentary sources, both from within and without the life insurance industry. Newspaper and magazine articles, preachers' sermons, contemporary tracts, and government reports were utilized. In general, these sources were analyzed in accordance with classical methods of historical inquiry, but theories and concepts developed in sociology, as well as in history, helped formulate the design of the research and the answers to the questions that were sought.

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THE RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT MAJOR: THE SUN OIL COMPANY, 1876-1945

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The modern, fully integrated Sun Oil Company had its origin in the Appalachian oil and natural gas fields in the 1870s. Joseph Newton Pew, Sr. founded the firm and his descendants owned and actively managed Sun's various interests until recently. After the forced dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911, market forces set in motion by the 1901 Spindletop discovery continued to effect change. Increasingly, the oil industry moved from a model of monopolistic to one of oligopolistic competition. In this new era, the term "independent" no longer designated a Standard competitor, but a nonintegrated crude oil producer, refiner, or marketer. At the same time, public oil policy evolved from antitrust to an increasing consensus and cooperation with industry leaders to bring stabilization through state and federal regulatory legislation. Recent works, including Gerald Nash's *United States Oil Policy, 1890-1964*, [1] have described these changes in industry structure and government policy.

My study examines the history of the Sun Oil Company to 1945, with particular reference to the thesis of consensus and cooperation. The story of a single firm that arose in a period of Standard Oil domination and matured in the new era after 1901 not only illuminates the development of this important corporation, but offers insights into the larger industry picture.

J. N. Pew, Sr. and his partner, Edward O. Emerson, initially found success in the natural gas business, and they were the first to pipe natural gas into a major city, Pittsburgh, in 1883. The partners began their petroleum operations following the Lima strike and formed the Sun Oil Company (Ohio) in 1888. Convinced that his future lay in expanding these activities, Pew bought out his partner's oil interests in 1899 following a dispute over business strategy and dividend policies. When the huge Spindletop boom came in 1901, Pew incorporated the Sun Company (New Jersey), obtained crude and production leases in Texas, arranged for tankships to transport crude to the East coast, and constructed a new refinery near Philadelphia.

Pew obtained financial backing from the United Gas Improvement Company of Philadelphia, a major purchaser of crude and gas oil for its illuminating gas plants. However, Sun soon established a reputation as a lubricant specialist after developing a process to refine the asphaltic Spindletop crude, and marketed a variety of trademarked products in Europe and the United States. In 1912, within months of the Standard dissolution decree, J. N. Pew, Sr. died and leadership of the firm passed to his sons, J. Howard and J. N., Jr.

In World War I, Sun profited from large sales of fuel oil and embarked on a then unique form of tertiary integration, the construction of the Sun Shipyard in 1916. After the war, the firm entered the automotive market with the introduction of Sunoco motor oil and soon opened its first gasoline stations. At this time the Ethyl Corporation was marketing tetraethyl lead to combat the problem of engine knock. The good quality of its straight-run, thermally cracked gasoline enabled Sun to avoid the lead controversy, and in 1927 the Pews introduced a new marketing strategy with the sale of their "Blue Sunoco" gasoline. Sun offered only one brand of unleaded gasoline, dyed blue, which retailed at a price three to five cents per gallon below the premium brands of its competition.

During the 1920s, Sun management opposed that segment of the industry urging the regulation of oil drilling. Howard and J. N. Pew, Jr.'s cousin, J. Edgar, became the second president of the American Petroleum Institute in 1924, and later, chairman of the "Committee of Eleven." The API formed this group to offset potential interference from the Coolidge-appointed Federal Oil Conservation Board.

In the 1930s Blue Sunoco encountered growing competition in Sun's eastern and midwestern marketing territory as higher compression engines forced octane requirements upward. In 1933 Sun found a solution by purchasing one-third interest in the Houdry catalytic cracking process first brought to the United States by the Vacuum Oil Company. Sun engineers developed a successful fixed-bed process that enabled the firm to produce high octane, lead-free gasoline. When war came, Houdry aviation fuel plants and the Sun Shipyard became important cogs in the US war production effort as well as profitable ventures for Sun.

Meanwhile, the New Deal had brought stability to the uneven production and rampant price structure of the western fields. Sun now fell into line with the other major integrated firms, but the Pews actively fought against the price fixing of refined products by the National Recovery Administration. J. Howard and J. N. Pew, Jr. became bitter opponents of the New Deal and viewed Roosevelt as a dangerous meddler with the free enterprise system. Both brothers and other members of the Pew family were large contributors to the Republican Party as well as to the American Liberty League and other organizations taking more reactionary anti-Roosevelt stances.

When war came, however, Sun Oil cooperated with the Petroleum Administration for War and J. Howard Pew publicly praised the efficient work of his old foe, oil administrator Harold L. Ickes. Sun entered into several aviation gasoline supply contracts with the government, but the Houdry group began to meet competition from the fluid catalytic process introduced by Jersey Standard in 1941.

Some oilmen were impressed with the advantages of wartime cooperation and proposed that it be extended into the postwar period. J. Howard Pew insisted on the dismemberment of all wartime agencies and led a successful fight against ratification of the Anglo-American treaty of 1945, an agreement to develop joint pipelines and define the interests of British and American firms operating in the Middle East. Pew's denunciation of international cartels was consistent with his previous opposition to New Deal "cartelization" and his fears that the oil industry might be nationalized.

The oil industry was not a monolith, but a mixture of large integrated firms; smaller integrated firms; independent producers, refiners, and marketers; domestic producers; and multinationals. Size and economic interest often determined particular positions on issues, but ideological views also help explain differences over the growing role of government as arbiter in the petroleum industry. The Pews' independent thinking surfaced in the operation of their business as well as in the doctrinaire free-enterprise philosophy they espoused. Their decisions to build their own oil tankers; to market an exclusively lead-free motor fuel outside the ethyl group; to innovate in product pipeline operations; to introduce catalytic cracking; and to refrain from foreign drilling operations were examples.

To a great extent Sun Oil was an anachronism in an age of giant corporations, modern management techniques, and business-government cooperation. This should not suggest that the firm was always a maverick. The Pews were active in the major-firm-dominated American Petroleum Institute and embraced industry-wide positions viewed as beneficial and consistent with their philosophy. Sun had become a "major" by the late 1920s and its interests often coincided with those of the largest companies. In 1939 the Temporary National Economic Commission ranked Sun 14th in size of the "top 20" integrated oil companies. However, in the main, Sun steered a surprisingly independent course. Conservatively managed and financially controlled by the Pew family, Sun resembled a 19th-century family enterprise more than a 20th-century modern corporation.

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THE DEPARTMENT STORE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN FRANCE
THE CASE OF THE BON MARCHE, 1869-1920

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My interest in the history of the Bon Marche department store -- the largest department store in the pre-World War I era -- follows from a desire to understand better those structural changes that occurred near the end of the 19th century and that have resulted in what may be characterized as our mass, bureaucratized, and rationalized age. More precisely, I have been drawn to the Bon Marche because I have seen it as a basic institution of this age, and thus in its history a means of comprehending what the foregoing changes have meant in social terms. In particular, I have found in the early history and development of the Bon Marche a record -- partial as it may be -- of how Western society was able to adapt to such a profound shift in its group relationships. Essentially, then, my study is one of modern change and socialization to that change. By exploring how the people who built the Bon Marche sought to adapt themselves, their work force, their clientele, and the public at large to the demands of their enterprise and the changes it was bringing about, I have examined, in one important sector, how men and women have been led to come to terms with a more rationalized, bureaucratized, and mass social system.

Now the means by which this policy of socialization was carried out was the creation by the Bon Marche of a new idea of community that could be identified with the organization, and the goals, of the department store. Within the firm this meant the creation of an internal work community of what may be called organization men -- that is, large numbers of employees who would think and act as members of an organization and transfer into this context their allegiances to both store and employer. Thus through the medium of a very high-powered paternalism -- fencing, music, and language lessons, medical and savings facilities, both a provident and a retirement fund, neither of which required contributions from the employees -- the owners of the Bon Marche were able to stabilize and control an ever increasing work force. Still more important, by structuring these programs so that the old household relationships of the small family shop were now correlated with the organization and goals of an expanding department store, they were further able to use their paternalism to create an internal work community within the framework of a dynamic and bureaucratic work system.

At the same time this pattern of paternalistic relationships must be viewed in terms of the owners' own adaptation to a new business role as head of a large-scale, bureaucratic, and dynamic commercial enterprise through the practice of first anchoring themselves in the traditional value system and then redefining these values to serve new commercial purposes. In this sense, then, the remarks of David Landes and others concerning the inherent conservatism of the French family firm may be regarded as too narrowly formulated. Evidently what was critical in determining entrepreneurial roles in a society where family values and family proprietorship were especially stressed, was not whether an enterprise remained a closed family firm founded on household relationships but rather the structure and orientation that were given to these relationships.

Finally, public relations at the Bon Marche fostered a new community image to adapt both clientele and the public at large to the new social relationships of the department store's world. On one level this meant the creation of a new community of house and clientele wherein a daily visit to the store -- and consumption for the pleasure of consuming -- would be identified with the bourgeois way of life. On another and broader level, the Bon Marche sought to project a public image of itself as a model French community within the context of a mass, rationalized society. This was done in order to counteract both direct attacks from small shopkeepers and the more ambivalent, yet equally menacing, attitudes on the part of the general bourgeois public who looked with uncertainty upon the seeming destruction of what may be termed a *gemeinschaftlich* way of life.