

# From “Wild Animal Stores” to Women’s Sphere: Supermarkets and the Politics of Mass Consumption, 1930-1950

Tracey Deutsch<sup>1</sup>

*Department of History  
University of Wisconsin-Madison*

In the fall of 1932, Chicago’s largest chain grocery – the National Tea Company – was completing a massive remodeling campaign in 250 of its Chicago-area stores. The new “super food stores” carried produce, delicatessen meats, fresh fish, and refrigerated meat, all in addition to the typical stock of dry groceries. The presentation of foods was at least as impressive as the range of foods. Customers in these stores found “sparkling” chrome casing on new refrigerated cases and illuminated shelving in the produce department. “Truly,” National Tea’s director proclaimed, this was “a housewife’s paradise” [Rasmussen, 1932, p. 644]. In the midst of rampant unemployment and relentless deflation, at a time when city officials worried that public riots would undermine any semblance of order, the National Tea Company invested in high-end, large stores.

That seemingly counter-intuitive move cannot be explained simply by economies of scale or internal efficiencies. If price had been their biggest draw, chain stores would have been far better off restricting themselves to low-margin items and low-cost stores. Indeed, other groceries followed precisely that formula – selling huge volumes of goods at very low prices in massive, barebones stores. Differences among these early versions of supermarkets can be explained by looking at the many possible meanings of femininity, and the importance of gender itself, in the operation of grocery stores. I argue that gender, economics and politics came together in the strategies embodied by supermarkets. As mass retailing made the shift from the small stores to large supermarkets, mass retailers also refigured how women ought to act inside of their stores. Operators of supermarkets, both chain and independent, survived the political and economic instability of the 1930s and 1940s by converging on the notion that food shopping could be pleasant, even relaxing, for upper middle-class women shoppers.

This shift in supermarket strategy, I argue, has profound implications for the ways in which historians conceptualize mass consumption in the United States. Lizabeth Cohen, who has provided some of the most provocative and

---

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Colleen Dunlavy, Dorothea Browder, and David Chang for helpful comments and much-appreciated encouragement. Any errors or omissions are of course my own.

insightful work on this phenomenon, describes a “consumer republic” emerging in the postwar years, with its roots in the 1930s [Cohen, 1998]. American society, Cohen recognizes, represented a particular kind of consumer republic: one in which consumers were at their least threatening. Here, consumption was an expression and extension of citizenship, but carried little promise of political leverage. Organized consumers simply did not exert power. I would argue that American consumer society was distinctive in two other ways as well. These particularities help explain the lack of power exerted by consumers, and suggest its profound consequences. The first particularity concerns the kind of stores (very large firms, often highly-centralized) which proved workable in the political environment of the 1930s and 1940s. The second particularity is the fact that most retailers and policymakers thought of the most important mass consumers, the people they needed to persuade, as women. I’ll talk about both of these characteristics though with more attention to the latter than to the former.

I’ll start by laying out some of the problems confronting grocers in the 1930s, and then suggest the very different tacks taken by proprietors of early independent supermarkets and chain grocers, who, I argue, premised operations around differing expectations of women’s behavior. Finally, I’ll describe a convergence during World War II and the immediate postwar years around upscale feminized shopping. Throughout, I want to view supermarkets as multifaceted institutions, places in which gender norms, power relations, and economic self-interest were all at play. I’ll also focus on Chicago, grounding the effects of a national phenomenon on local communities.

To foreground this story, we need to understand what was going on outside of stores themselves in the early 1930s, at the moment when supermarkets made their first appearance. Of course grocers faced falling sales and the ravages of deflation, but politics, as well as economics, gave grocers pause in this period. This was a moment of particular unsettledness in food retailing not only because sales fell, but because it was suddenly unclear that overt price appeals, the hallmark of the new age of mass retailing, would survive new government policies and would continue to fully satisfy women customers — long assumed to be grocers’ most important clientele.

The political problems chains faced took two forms. On the one hand, the anti-chain movement was gaining momentum. In May of 1931, the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s punitive tax on chain stores; the decision was followed by a new willingness among state legislators to listen to long-standing complaints of independent grocers and their wholesalers. Lawmakers introduced a slew of new taxation and licensing bills, many of which would have levied enormous taxes on chain stores — the more stores firms owned, the more they paid per store [“The Indiana Chain Store Tax Decision,” 1931, p.37]. (One of the most punitive of these anti-chain measures was introduced in Illinois, which seems to have been especially contested territory for anti-chain forces [Lyons, 1931, p. 46].) By the mid-1930s, chains’ problems were worsening as national anti-chain activity reached new heights. The FTC investigation into

chain stores, the Robinson-Patman Bill, an anti-trust prosecution of A&P, and Representative Wright Patman's push for the infamous "Chain Store Death Sentence Bill" all accompanied growing state-level interest in anti-chain laws [Federal Trade Commission, 1935; Adelman, 1959; Tedlow, 1990, pp. 214-220; Bean, 1996]. For operators of chain grocery stores in Chicago and elsewhere in the 1930s, economic difficulties were only the beginning of their problems.

In addition to the anti-chain laws, a newly organized and vocal consumer movement suggest that gender politics — the relationship between the mostly male employees and operators of stores and the mostly female clientele — was also changing. Women's groups were increasingly vocal supporters of the growing "consumer movement" and demanded such changes as graded canned goods and standardized sizes of products with clearly marked labels. The growth of stores that gave voice to consumers' dissatisfaction was even more troubling. Chain stores had seemed all but unstoppable in the 1920s, but consumer cooperatives, sustained by the purchases and volunteered labor of women members, grew in the 1930s, even as chain stores were closing unprofitable stores [Gubin, 1937, pp. 816-838; Parker, 1938, pp. 223-239; "Business Highlights," 1931, p. 67; "A&P Tonnage Drops Only 4% as Dollar Sales Fall 14.3%, Annual Report Shows," 1933, p. 48]. Mass retailing seemed far less stable in the 1930s than most grocers had expected.

Although chain stores were shaken by the growth rate of consumer cooperative societies, the overall sales of these co-op societies remained relatively small [Parker, 1938; Gubin, 1937, pp. 816-838]. Supermarkets, begun as independent operations and not part of established chain stores, were a different story. I want to describe these first supermarkets in some detail as a way of explaining the challenges they posed to gender norms, gender relations, and to the better-entrenched chain stores.

The 1930s saw the establishment and the rapid growth of the first "super markets" [Zimmerman, 1955; Phillips, 1938, pp. 188-200]. These were massive stores, often housed in abandoned warehouses or factories. They did not easily fit into any existing typology of grocery stores. While nominally independent, the stores often sold huge volumes of mass-produced goods and opened branch stores, thus clearly engaging in mass retailing and resembling chains. On the other hand, single stores were often large enough that proprietors felt little need to open more than a few branches — owners stubbornly insisted that their supermarkets were far closer to "independents" than to chains ["The Voluntary and the Super," 1937, pp. 12-13; Ramis, 1940, p. 41; "Independent or Chain," 1940, p. 44]. Moreover, while their primary focus was grocery sales, these early supermarkets often sold a wide range of goods and services — everything from candy to shoe repair to beauty salons. Finally, supermarkets were generally more interested in open land and parking lots than in neighborhood business districts, the traditional site of grocery stores. Indeed, supermarkets were generally on the fringes of residential districts, where large buildings and parking lots were easier to locate.

The most famous and one of the earliest self-proclaimed super markets

exemplified the new possibilities for mass retailing when it opened in late 1932 in an old auto factory in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The Big Bear market boasted a soda fountain and hardware and paints departments, all in addition to a very large grocery section [Tedlow, 1990, p. 233]. “King Kullen” stores, the brainchild of ex-Kroger store manager Michel Cullen, were slightly smaller than Big Bear stores, but no less successful. By 1935 there were fifteen King Kullen stores up and down Long Island [Tedlow, 1990, p. 233; Zimmerman, 1955, p. 39]. These early supermarkets made a name for themselves by selling at very low prices — occasionally selling below their own cost on so-called “loss-leaders.” Indeed, ads referred to stores as “Price Crusher” or “Price Wrecker” [Zimmerman, 1955, p. 40]. The cavernous, ungainly stores were also remarkably successful. In its first three *days*, the first Big Bear store sold over \$31,000 worth of goods, about what an A&P store sold in six *months*, according to historian Richard Tedlow’s calculations [Tedlow, 1990, p. 233]. By 1936, there were 1,200 self-proclaimed supermarkets across the country [Zimmerman, 1955, p. 54].

Supermarkets opened later in Chicago than on the east coast, but by 1937 established chains and small independents in Chicago were facing competition from at least twenty-five supermarkets, one of which claimed annual sales of over \$3 million [Zimmerman, 1937, pp. 7, 20; “The Voluntary and the Super,” 1937, p. 13]. That same year, a Chicago chain-store executive repeated Michael Cullen’s success, leaving Kroger’s to start his own supermarket. So successful had supermarkets become that Michael Roney promised Chicagoans a chain of nine “High Low” supermarkets. Within two years Roney had surpassed even that optimistic goal, as he celebrated the opening of his fourteenth store [“News Highlights,” 1938, p. 68; “Movements in the Super Market World,” 1939, p. 29]. Unlike co-ops, the threat that upstart supermarkets posed to chains was actual, and not just potential.

Established chain stores were at first entirely unwilling to create their own supermarkets. Many felt that such stores were inherently unstable. “The superstore in its present form may prove to be a ‘depression baby,’ noted one chain store analyst [Landau, 1937, p. 24]. That instability was, chains felt, almost unavoidable, given supermarkets’ dependence on very low prices. Fierce price competition was both economically suicidal and politically unwise in an era of organized anti-chain movements and government attempts to keep prices up [Landau, 1937, p. 24; Holden, 1933, pp. 18-19, 30-32; Zimmerman, 1939, p. 4].

More often, however, chain store owners and analysts were troubled by what they felt was the flouting of any sort of social order, especially of gender norms, in such stores. One retailer referred to supermarkets as “wild animal stores” — a reference to the names — Big Bear, Big Tiger, Big Bull — and to the animal-like behavior which such stores’ promotions seemed to bring out in customers [Landau, 1937, p. 24; Zimmerman, 1939, p. 4]. “The man and wife don’t know each other as they pass through the turnstile, each with the ‘limit’ bagged for the exit. Taking these to the car, they return and again stock up on below-cost goods” [Holden, 1933, p. 31]. The sheer lack of regard for convention in these stores was both perplexing and disturbing. Referring to a new genera-

tion of “can-opener cooks” who would rather purchase canned food than do their own cooking with fresh ingredients, a chain-store researcher speaking at an annual convention of food chains noted other surprising aspects of women’s behavior. “Apparently there are very few people who are ashamed to go into one of these ‘wild animal’ markets and lug a basket around,” he wrote. “There is the desire or willingness on the part of many customers to do some shopping in the evening. I do not understand this desire fully, but it seems to exist” [Schmalz, 1937, p. 38].

This characterization of supermarkets as free-for-alls was not entirely wrong. Independent supermarkets featured what can only be called remarkable festivities in promotional campaigns. When the Family Market Basket opened a supermarket on Chicago’s north side it gave away pictures “suitable for framing” and shopping bags to the 20,000 people who visited on opening day [“Family Market Basket Reopens in Chicago, 1937, p. 5]. The line outside another Chicago store went around the block at its opening day, even though it was open only for walk-throughs and was not selling any goods that day [“Remodeled Super Opens in Suburb of Chicago,” 1939]. The 26th Street Food Mart in working-class Garfield Park celebrated its fifth anniversary in 1939 by giving away souvenirs to children, hosting huge demonstrations of sausage-making and cooking, and offering free soup greens [“Celebration in Chicago Mart,” 1939, p. 27].

The importance of advertising and sheer spectacle was exemplified by Dawson’s, the city’s largest supermarket for much of this period and the brain-child of one of the founders of New Jersey’s Big Bear chain. The store featured towering displays of merchandise in its 72,000 square-foot selling area. The spectacle began even before customers entered the store. Dawson’s bragged of a five-acre parking lot, and of twelve-page advertising circulars distributed within a ten-mile radius of the store. The firm claimed to spend \$120,000 annually on advertising — far more money than a typical grocery store took in, in a year.<sup>2</sup>

However unrefined such advertising seemed, supermarket operators embraced its mass appeal. “The secret of Super Market merchandising,” wrote one observer of Dawson’s, “is just such ballyhoo — just such ‘mass’ impressions, even to the display of merchandise” [“Dawson’s Trading Post in Chicago Does a Volume of \$3,000,000 Annually,” 1936, p. 18; “Dawson’s Trading Post, A Pioneer’s Vision Fulfilled,” 1936, pp. 6-7, 16]. These tactics echoed those used by supermarkets all over the country. Carl’s supermarket in Miami, for instance, once hosted 6,000 people for a public wedding [“Carl’s Market Invites Miami to a Super Wedding,” 1939, p. 53].

Neither the marketing campaigns nor the aesthetics of these early supermarkets bore much resemblance to the strategies many older chains had adopted. By looking at chains’ attempts to solve the problems of falling sales and

---

<sup>2</sup> In 1935, 76% of all grocery stores made less than \$10,000 a year. *Retail Distribution Volume I, United States Summary*, U.S. Census of Business: 1935, (Washington DC, 1937), p. 1-33.

anti-chain fervor, we can get a better sense of the unsettled nature of 1930s retailing, the importance of gender norms and gender relations to store strategy, and see the roots of postwar mass consumption.

When chains were faced with falling prices and profits in early 1930 and 1931, they at first simply closed unprofitable units. Fairly quickly, however, they also tried to move away from older price-oriented appeals, both because of the constant danger that chains would hurt themselves with constant below-cost price wars, and because public and political support for chains' sometimes cut-throat price-competition was wearing thin. Instead, chains emphasized the special attention they paid to women and to women's propriety in their stores. This, of course, was in line with their own sense that women were their most important customers. Kroger stores began hiring professional "homemakers" who demonstrated meals and products in stores and at women's club meetings [Laycock, 1983, p. 38]. National Tea began distributing recipes to female shoppers [Hatfield, 1936, p. 35]. A&P began publishing *Woman's Day*, a magazine distributed free in its stores ["News Highlights," 1937, p. 56].

Jewel Food Stores, a newcomer among Chicago's food chains, undertook one of the most dramatic appeals to women customers of the 1930s. The chain lost money steadily throughout the early 1930s. In 1934, the firm was desperate. Already focused on high-income areas, Jewel began conducting house-to-house interviews with women they identified as "housewives" who lived near the stores [Hatfield, 1936, pp. 8-9]. By the end of the surveying process, Jewel claimed to have talked with over 18,000 housewives and to have taken their suggestions on everything from store color to store cleanliness to the themes of store advertisements. Indeed, Jewel celebrated its survey in subsequent ads, assuring would-be customers that "18,389 women planned this store" [Kasch, 1934, pp. 13-15; Bostwick, 1949, p. 23].

Chains, like independents, *also* expanded the size of their stores — opening so-called combination stores that sold both meat and dry groceries. The goal was not always greater economies of scale, however. Large stores had the added advantage of acting as end-runs around anti-chain laws. When states passed anti-chain laws, they taxed chains based on the number of units they owned, not on sales per store. Opening fewer stores, then, at least lessened the threat posed by these new taxes.

Even here, however, where there were clear political incentives to open large stores, established chains *justified* doing so by emphasizing the ways that such stores would meet women's, at least respectable middle and upper-class women's, requirements. The National Tea store in an upper-class neighborhood of the city was "a fine example of modern efficiency and productiveness in store equipment," according to the editors of *Chain Store Age*. Why? At least in part because its layout, cleanliness, wide open aisles, even the lowered height of its meat trays, would make women more comfortable in the store ["National Tea Sets Modern Standard in Remodeled Unit," 1933, pp. 20, 48-49]. By 1932, both the trend towards larger stores, and the justification in gendered language, were widespread. Even landlords were often willing to pick up the

cost of remodeling a store for their chain store tenants, presumably because such changes would make the store a stable, permanent lessee. In an article celebrating the fact that one third of reporting chains had not had to pay any remodeling costs themselves, one executive of a grocery chain noted that “[t]he trend is definitely away from the little hole-in-the-wall store.” He went on to note that chains were constructing “stores at which it is possible to serve the customer for her complete table needs” [“Chains Spend \$37,000,000 on Store Construction,” 1934, p. 63].

The first supermarkets moved along entirely different tracks. Supermarkets did not trade up; they did not focus on middle-class women; they did not subsume price appeals and they did not encourage propriety. While supermarkets certainly engaged in mass retailing and tried to adapt to changing times, the very gender norms and gender relations on which chains had based their reconstruction were threatened by each dramatic success of the barebones — so-called “barny” — supermarket.

In some ways, the chain stores were right to look askance at these first supermarkets and at the chaotic shopping within these stores. Many did prove unwieldy. Price appeals, selling below cost, and sheer in-fighting amongst the many parties involved in financing and running a large store did in more than a few of these shops. Dawson’s, for instance, disappeared within a few years of its opening in a flurry of lawsuits and counter-lawsuits [“Dawson Files Suit,” 1937, p. 21; “Dawson Issues Statement,” 1937, p. 21]. The leadership of the Super Market Institute, the first trade association for such stores, lobbied for months to get members’ support for a resolution which condemned loss leaders [Zimmerman, 1939, p. 4]. Moreover supermarkets began facing their own political nightmare, as municipalities and some state legislatures entertained bills to specifically hamper these very large stores [Zimmerman, 1955, pp. 43-45, 118-120].

By the late 1930s, both independent supermarkets and the more established chains’ supermarkets were gradually converging around a more stable, less price-oriented kind of store — and a new kind of mass retailing. One Chicago grocer explained that he was re-opening his supermarket, previously “a promotional scheme,” as a “profitable food business” [“Family Market Basket Reopens in Chicago, 1937, p. 5]. At the same time, supermarket operators were also converging around a new way of thinking about women shoppers. The annual convention of supermarkets featured speakers urging the stores to avoid the “circus-like” atmosphere of the past and to use “the feminine touch” in store decorating and store services [Gibson, 1937, pp. 38-40]. So noticeable were the up-market features of new supermarkets that a 1938 report by the Harvard Business School felt compelled to comment on this change. Stores which had previously featured cheaper baskets now featured more expensive wheeled shopping carts. Delivery was more widely available and some stores even provided customers with help carrying groceries to their car [Phillips, 1938, pp. 199-200]. A gendered order, and not a price-shaving free-for-all, characterized these second-wave stores.

When chain stores opened their own supermarkets, they relied on their own upmarket strategies and refigured women's super market shopping as a sign — not of crazed bargain-hunting or of a desire for cheap thrills — but of families' middle-class status. In the process, they narrowed the reach of the “mass” in mass consumption. As with the earlier shift to “combination” stores, these larger stores were especially attractive in light of the per-store taxes threatened by anti-chain forces [Phillips, 1938, p. 196]. But again these stores were justified and explained in terms of their ability to attract middle-class and upper-class women customers. In 1937 National Tea opened one of its first Chicago supermarkets to great fanfare. Observers noted that the new supermarket would surely bring in “the better class of trade” [“National Tea Company Opens Chicago Food Super,” 1937, p. 10]. Similarly, Kroger opened its own “double food mart” in the very well-to-do South Shore neighborhood, “a section where all other chains have modern stores” [“Movements in the Super Market World,” 1939, p. 63]. A&P built its first supermarket in the city in the same neighborhood [“A&P Plans Its First Chicago Super Market,” 1937, p. 23].

Both supermarkets and upscale femininity became increasingly important to chain and independent grocers in the 1940s as federal policy, alongside the low prices of large stores shaped the future of mass retailing. Put simply, large stores that could maintain order were best able to meet the new requirements of federal-level regulations. Here, in the wartime fortunes of chains and supermarkets, we can see the ways in which the politics of gender relations in large grocery stores were linked to the more formal policies of the state.

Large stores, especially chains, were generally easier for the federal government to regulate than were smaller and less centralized independent stores. Always ambivalent about empowering individual women to police stores' compliance, federal officials were happy to work through centralized institutions which could control store employees, and store prices, all from the top down [Putnam, 1947]. In the words of one Chicago-area price control official, chain stores could “more easily be kept in line” than could smaller, neighborhood stores [Goetz, 1945, pp. 2-3]. This inspector's confidence was built on the supposition that chains' centralized control of their stores would guarantee compliance. For example, district administrators at the Office of Price Administration allowed Chicago chains to channel all complaints against individual stores through firms' central offices, rather than through the management of the accused stores, in order, they explained, to facilitate chains' full cooperation with government policy [Christensen, 1943].

Moreover, large stores were especially useful for the on-going struggle against inflation. Federal officials took it almost as a given that chains and independent supermarkets would charge prices that were not only lower than other stores but below the ceiling prices allowed to them by law [“Springfield District Office to All War and Rationing Boards,” 1943]. When the federal government began grouping stores into different classes, and setting price ceilings for each class, chain stores and stores with over \$250,000 in annual sales were assumed to need a smaller profit margin, and so had lower ceilings than inde-



pendents [Mansfield et al, 1947, p. 63]. The lower prices of supermarkets, and consumers' compliance with the decorum and orderly shopping of large stores, were now matters of public policy.

As the war wound down, the federal governments' wartime emphasis on the orderly shopping of large chains melted into a general cultural acceptance of the idea that food stores ought to convey status, as well as low prices. Upscale supermarkets were welcomed into postwar suburban housing developments in and around Chicago and quickly began emphasizing the quality and convenience of goods they sold, continuing to move away from an emphasis on price [Sanning, 1946, p. 71; "Ready-cut poultry pushed in advertisement," 1946, p. 169]. Jewel, invited to open the first supermarket in the planned community of Park Forest, encapsulated the new ethos of supermarkets. "Better Living for More People" proclaimed their postwar advertising [*The Crusader*, 1952, pp. 47, 62; "Variety of Foods Listed," 1945, p. 118].

Owners of chain and independent supermarkets came to hope for customers who would be satisfied with a store's amenities and prices, and who would not make personal demands on store personnel. New stores, while not warehouse-sized, were quite large and featured self-serve refrigerated cases, produce departments, as well as miles and miles of canned goods and dry groceries on open shelving. The older chaotic supermarkets were quickly replaced by the ordered, and overtly-feminized, space of the postwar supermarket.

In 1955, the editors of *Life* magazine published a now-famous cover which depicted a well-dressed woman pushing an overflowing shopping cart. In doing so, the editors were capturing a moment which would have looked implausible, even in the very recent past. Not only had stores grown in size, but the very notion that a woman would be happy and calm shopping in a grocery store was a relatively new one. The term "mass luxury" used as a caption by these editors simply did not describe the very unluxurious surroundings of many food stores. As the editors knew well, it was the feminized luxury, as much as the scale, of the new stores that was remarkable. How and where women shopped had changed dramatically over the previous twenty years, a result of the on-going economies of scale and low prices of large stores, but also of government policy and grocers' desire to build a new gendered order.

## References

- "A&P Plans Its First Chicago Super Market," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (1937), 23.
- "A&P Tonnage Drops Only 4% as Dollar Sales Fall 14.3%, Annual Report Shows," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 9 (1933), 48.
- Bostwick, Frank, "Why Jewel Sparkles," *Central Manufacturing District Magazine*, 33 (1949), 23.
- "Business Highlights," *Progressive Grocer*, 10 (1931), 67.
- Bean, Jonathan, *Beyond the Broker State: Federal Policies toward Small Business, 1936-1961* (Chapel Hill, 1996).

- "Carl's Market Invites Miami to a Super Wedding," *Super Market Merchandising*, 4 (1939), 53.
- "Celebration in Chicago Mart," *Super Market Merchandising*, 5 (1939), 27.
- "Chains Spend \$37,000,000 on Store Construction," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 10 (November 1934), 63.
- Christensen, C.L. to Kenneth T. Rowe, "Price Panel Operations in the Gary Campaign," August 13, 1943, Gary Experiment, Box 1508, Series 270, Records of Region VI, RG 188, National Office of Price Administration, Great Lakes Regional Branch, National Archives, Chicago, Illinois.
- Cohen, Lizabeth, "The New Deal State and the Making of Citizen Consumers," Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judt, eds., *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Society in the Twentieth Century* (New York: 1998), 111-125.
- "Dawson Files Suit," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (1937), 21.
- "Dawson Issues Statement," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (January 1937), 21.
- "Dawson's Trading Post, A Pioneer's Vision Fulfilled," *Super Market Merchandising*, 1 (1936), 6-7, 16.
- "Dawson's Trading Post in Chicago Does a Volume of \$3,000,000 Annually," *Super Market Merchandising*, 1 (1936), 18.
- "Family Market Basket Reopens in Chicago," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (1937), 5.
- Federal Trade Commission, *Chain Stores: Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation*, (Washington, DC, 1935).
- Gibson, Luis, "Operating a Super Market to Please Ten Million Women," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (1937), 38-40.
- Goetz, Rachel M. to Members of the Consumer Advisory Committee, Chicago Metropolitan Office of Price Administration, "Black Markets in Meat," May 21, 1945, Board Operations Reports—Volunteers, Box 11, Series 1243, RG 188, Office of Price Administration Records, Great Lakes Branch of National Archives, pp. 2-3.
- Gubin, Sidney, "Consumers' Cooperatives in Chicago," *Monthly Labor Review*, 45 (1937), 816-838.
- Hatfield, Myrna, *An Analysis of Some Grocery Store Practices From The Viewpoint of the Woman Buyer* (unpublished M.A.Thesis, University of Chicago, 1936), 35.
- Holden, A.E., "Is Price-Wrecking Wrecking the Super-Markets?" *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 9 (1933), 18-19, 30-32.
- "Independent or Chain," *Super Market Merchandising*, 5 (1940), 44.
- "The Indiana Chain Store Tax Decision," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 7 (1931), 37, 75.
- "The Jewel Story," *The Crusader*, (Special 20 years edition, 1952), 47, 62.
- Kasch, F.M., "Increasing Volume by Overcoming Customer Resistance," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 10 (1934), 13-15.
- Landau, Frank, "Is the Price-Wrecking Market Here to Stay?" *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 13 (1937), 24.
- Laycock, George, *The Kroger Story: A Century of Innovation* (Cincinnati, 1983), 38.
- Lebhar, Godfrey M., "Chain Store Progress in 1930," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 7 (1931), 32.
- Lyons, Robert W., "Annual Report for 1930-1931," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 7 (1931), 46.

- Mansfield, Harvey C. and Associates, *A Short History of the Office of Price Administration*, Historical Reports on War Administration: Office of Price Administration, General Publication No. 15, (Washington DC, 1947), 63.
- "Movements in the Super Market World," *Super Market Merchandising*, 4 (1939), 63.
- "Movements in the Super Market World," *Super Market Merchandising*, 4 (1939), 29.
- "National Tea Company Opens Chicago Food Super," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 2 (1937), 10.
- "National Tea Sets Modern Standard in Remodeled Unit," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 9 (1933), 20, 48-49.
- "News Highlights," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 13 (1937), 56.
- "News Highlights," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 14 (1938), 68.
- Parker, Florence, "Consumers' Cooperation in the United States, 1920-1936," *Monthly Labor Review*, 38 (1938), 223-239.
- Phillips, Charles F., "The Supermarket," *Harvard Business Review*, 16 (1938), 188-200.
- Putnam, Imogene, *Volunteers in OPA*. Historical Reports on War Administration: Office of Price Administration, General Publication Number 14 (Washington, DC, 1947).
- Ramis, L., "The Complete Super Food Market," *Super Market Merchandising*, 5 (1940), 91.
- Rasmussen, R.V., "We've Profited by the Times To Build or Remodel 250 Stores," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 8 (1932), 644, 698.
- "Ready-cut Poultry Pushed in Advertisement," *Chain Store Age, Grocery Managers Edition*, 22 (1946), 169.
- "Remodeled Super Opens in Suburb of Chicago," *Super Market Merchandising*, 4 (1939).
- Sanning, William J., "New Policy Announced for Kroger Private Labels," *Chain Store Age, Grocery Managers Edition*, 22 (1946), 71.
- Schmalz, Carl, "Why the Food Chains Need Research," *Chain Store Age, Administration Edition*, 13 (1937), 38.
- Springfield District Office to All War and Rationing Boards, "Over-Riding Prices for Group III and IV Stores," December 28, 1943, Box 1508, Series 270, RG 188, Office of Price Administration Records, Great Lakes Branch of National Archives, Chicago, Illinois.
- Tedlow, Richard, *New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America*, (New York, 1990), 214-220.
- "Variety of Foods Listed," *Chain Store Age, Grocery Managers Edition*, 21 (1945), 118.
- "The Voluntary and the Super," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (1937), 12-13.
- Woody, Elizabeth, "The Consumer and the Super Market," *Super Market Merchandising*, 4 (1939), 53.
- Zimmerman, M.M., "Facing 1939: The Present Status of the Super Market," *Super Market Merchandising*, 4 (1939).
- Zimmerman, M.M., *The Super Market: A Revolution in Distribution*, (New York, 1955).
- Zimmerman, M.M., "Super Markets, Article No. 4 — Growth and Progress in Industrial Centers," *Super Market Merchandising*, 2 (1937), 7, 20.

