

"Lurking in the Wings . . .": Women in the Historiography of the Industrial Revolution

Jane Humphries
Cambridge University

The analysis of gender develops through four stages [40]. First comes the realization of how much women have been neglected, and second the exposure of theoretical and empirical fallacies made glaringly apparent by this realization. In the third stage, the results of research on women are added to mainstream discussions, which gives rise to yet a fourth stage in which the resulting analytical dualism is criticized and demands are made for greater integration.

The stages are discernible in the development of economic historians' interest in women. The first priority was to learn more about women in order to rectify earlier neglect. This stage of the research program has flourished. Building on the classic texts [for example, 32, 10], and continuing through new studies of wives, mothers, and workers with different class backgrounds and family circumstances, a picture of the economic experience of women has emerged. But work on women was needed for correctness as well as completeness. Women had to be put back into the historical contexts from which they had been abstracted, and in the process economic historians needed to revise their understanding not only of the historical meaning of gender but also of the economic processes in which women were now seen as active participants [34]. As yet integration remains rudimentary.

Mainstream economic history's lack of response to the accumulation of research on women is all the more surprising in that historical analysis of gender has affirmed women's importance in economic life. Subordinated as they might have been politically and socially, this did not exclude women from work, consumption, thrift, or accumulation. Indeed women's subordination seems to have been interwoven with their economic activities so that it molded the economic itself and not simply the terms and conditions under which women took part. The case for integration with, and therefore revision of, the mainstream texts is importunate.

What I want to do here is to take three much-debated issues from the historiography of English industrialization, and to show in each case, how the recognition of female experience, which conveys with it the historical diversity of the family economy, produces not only a more complete picture, but a better understanding of the economic processes themselves. The issues are the role of enclosures in the genesis of the English proletariat, the causes of

population growth in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and changes in the standard of living during the industrial revolution.

Initially economic historians were sharply divided on these issues. But debate has narrowed and the resulting consensus are now entrenched in textbooks with the status of veracities. Blinkered by contemporary stereotypes of male breadwinners with dependent wives and children, economic historians have implicitly assumed family forms which have always been more ideals than realities. Researchers have focussed almost exclusively on the male experience and seldom located it in a historically correct family and labor market context. As a result they have been misled.

In the debate about the role of enclosures in the creation of a wage dependent class in late eighteenth century England, implicit assumptions about family structure and organization have meant that proletarianization has been interpreted ahistorically as the transformation of a self-sufficient peasantry into breadwinning wage laborers. In reality, for many eighteenth century working-class people survival depended not on a single breadwinner but on the productive contributions of all family members [28]. Proletarianization was a gradual process whereby access to resources other than wages was slowly eliminated, with uneven and particularized impacts on different family members.

Because economic historians were insensitive to the importance of family participation in securing an eighteenth century livelihood, they did not appreciate the value of traditional rights, particularly common access to land, in facilitating contributions from wives and children and indeed on occasion affording women and children some modicum of independence. I have shown that women and children were the principal agents exploiting traditional rights and common resources, and that activities based on these rights had a hitherto unsuspected material significance [20]. Recognition of the importance of these resources to women and children, and through them to the families concerned, forces a revision of the value of the commons and incidentally of the role of enclosures in the genesis of wage dependence.

Turning to the demographic debate, Wrigley and Schofield's classic text [43] established changes in fertility and not mortality as the driving force behind population growth in the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and changes in age at marriage as the principal causal mechanism. Although they were anxious to see family formation, and derivatively age at marriage, as the outcome of rational decision-making heavily loaded with economic considerations,¹ their modelling of the economic determinants of demographic change was less convincing.

Wrigley and Schofield recognized that the decision to marry involved many participants, including the bride and groom, their parents, on occasion other kin, and in a more diffuse sense the community in which they lived. Yet in their modelling exercise they reduced the economic considerations

¹"Marriage is a deliberate act in all societies, and in a society in which marriage is not tied by custom to physical maturity, it must be responsive to the actors' appreciation of their circumstances" [43, p. 417].

governing family formation to trends in the real wages of adult males as indicated by the Phelps-Brown and Hopkins series on nominal wages and prices. This simplification of the economic determinants of marriage seems at odds with the complexity of their transmission into fertility outcomes. Thus the strangely long lags that Wrigley and Schofield observed between the turning points in the Phelps-Brown and Hopkins series and the turning points in fertility were explained by the possible importance of parental attitudes in the marriage decision and hence, derivatively, the importance of the economic (that is male real wage) experience of the previous generation. Although other work has cast independent doubt on the length of the lags identified [31], and found shorter and perhaps more plausible lags, the point here is that the foremost text in this crucial debate, while incidentally recognizing women's participation in the decision to marry, makes no attempt to link this back into the economic model of population change. This is all the more problematic given that it is women's age at marriage that is the key in fertility change.

Perhaps women's employment and wages may turn out to be insignificant in explaining demographic trends. Ann Kussmaul's recent analysis of the seasonality of weddings supports such a view [24]. The argument is simple but clever. Agricultural work was governed by distinct annual rhythms and weddings accommodated themselves to these tempos: infrequent during the months of maximum work when interruptions would jeopardize crops, and bunched after the peaks of effort and risk. Thus the seasonality of marriage discloses a community's dominant economic activity: a predominance of autumn marriages indicates arable farming, a predominance of spring/summer weddings indicates pastoral work, especially rearing, and no tendency towards seasonal peaks indicates the importance of protoindustry. But marriage seasonality seems to have been unaffected by women's work, "the single most frustrating blindness of this general view" [24, p. 17]. Districts combining male labor in arable farming with female employment in straw plaiting and lacemaking look "resolutely autumnal in their marriage seasonality, and are indistinguishable from areas without that women's industrial work" [24, p. 17]. Higher male wages and the seasonally uniform costs of time facing female industrial workers go some way to explaining the dominance of male employment in the marriage decision. It may well be that Wrigley and Schofield's emphasis on male wages as the determinant of family formation is justified, but the "secondary" nature of women's work implicit in marriage seasonality deserves further study and cannot simply be assumed from the outset.

Other authors have tried to develop Wrigley and Schofield's economic explanation of changes in fertility in ways which provide a better empirical fit with contemporaneous events and so avoid the unconvincing delayed-response story. Most alternative models, in one way or another, link the fertility changes through age at marriage, proportions marrying, and even illegitimate fertility, to structural changes in employment and in particular to the development of protoindustry [see the extensive literature surveyed in 39].

In the alternative models the real wages of adult males become only one of a set of relevant economic determinants of family formation. There is space for the employment opportunities and wage levels of women and

children to affect the decision to marry. Indeed the protoindustrial school has made much of such links, arguing that rural industry liberated marriage from the necessity of prior acquisition of land or property by raising the possibility of founding a family on the labor incomes of family members, and so brought down the age at marriage [11]. Some authors have even seen marriage as a necessary precondition for participation in the protoindustrial economy, as the only way in which individual workers could secure the ancillary labor required. The problem with this perspective is that women's economic contribution, while recognized, is by assumption attached to men's and subsumed in the family economy.

David Levine's well-known work on Colyton [25], a parish made famous by Wrigley's pioneer family reconstitution, provides a good example of "adding-on" the gender dimension. Levine believed that Colyton had a wood-pasture economy consisting of small farms and a thriving woollen industry which collapsed in the late seventeenth century when the new draperies by-passed Colyton. He linked the related local depression to the rise in the age at marriage as male wages fell. However, he also argued that lacemaking and dairying which employed women and children became important enough in the second half of the eighteenth century to account for the fall in female age at marriage. Levine believed that lacemaking gave women attractive dowries which allowed them to marry earlier.

Pamela Sharpe questions Levine's implicit assumption that women normally wanted to marry early and were only constrained from doing so by economic exigency [36]. Sharpe insists on a closer look at the experience of the women of Colyton, and on understanding them as independent and rational historical agents and not merely prospective members of (economic circumstances permitting) to-be-formed families. For completeness it matters. By looking at the experience of women who never married or who married late she offers a fuller socio-economic picture. But also by looking at the demographic data in a gender-specific way she identifies a new economic determinant of fertility, and one that in the case of Colyton at least explains some outstanding demographic puzzles.

Low sex ratios in Colyton in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries suggest a sex-specific migration caused by differential employment opportunities, which Sharpe suggests were created by an important lacemaking industry. Lacemaking in Colyton flourished in the seventeenth century but appears to have gone into subsequent decline. The history of lacemaking does not fit Levine's story, since its growth coincided with an increase in women's age at marriage, whereas trade lapsed from 1740 to 1840, which was a period of falling age at marriage for women: a chronology which "suggests precisely the opposite of Levine's theory then as lacemaking is associated with the period of late marriage for women" [36, p. 53].

A detailed look at the history of the local economy in conjunction with the demographic data, enlivened by references to individual women's lives, demonstrates that women's work was neither a corollary to nor a complement of men's work. Lacemaking did not require a family production unit. It was separate and distinct in terms of the jobs involved, the wages earned, and the time spent in employment. It promoted the independence of

women as wage earners in their own right, and this played a role in the maintenance of the age at marriage. The fall in the age at marriage was associated with more work available for men and a more generous poor law provision for families, but a decline in two important sources of female employment. Here as elsewhere [35, 14, 37], there are hints that as their economic prospects became more insecure women may have married earlier to assure a livelihood. Thus what seems important in modelling demographic change is to look at the economic opportunities facing both men and women; the effects of changes in the male wage on family formation may be conditional on the contemporaneous experience of female employment and earnings. As Sharpe concludes, pockets of domestic industrialization affording some economic independence to women may have acted as a break on population growth before the mid-eighteenth century, and local deindustrializations may have been a factor in the eighteenth century decline in age at marriage precisely because women's earnings were not a supplement to family income but "a self supporting livelihood" [36, p. 63]. When the latter declined, marriage was a more attractive option. The stress on male wages and male work, and, where recognized, the perception of women's wages and women's work as supplements to household income and complements to male work within a protoindustrial family workforce, not only marginalizes and misconstrues women's position but obscures important economic determinants of demographic change.

The third issue has probably been the most contentious in economic history: what happened to the standard of living of the working class during English industrialization. After more than half a century of debate, the pessimists have retreated to the periphery, holding ground only in terms of timing and idealist counterfactuals. The relatively optimistic consensus is based on trends in indices of the standard of living calculated from aggregate data, for example per capita income, or surviving labor and product market data, for example real wages. Lindert and Williamson [26] and Williamson [41] represent the confident cutting-edge of the optimist position. Their claim is that the process of industrialization brought impressive net gains in the standard of life of over 60% for farm laborers, over 86% for "blue-collar workers," and over 140% for all workers.

These averages may bear little relationship to the divergent experiences of the real people who lived through these turbulent times. Moreover, the evidence on wages and inequality, on which the optimists' new economic history has been constructed, relates almost exclusively to men. Few have considered women's employment and remuneration and fewer still the distribution of family resources between men and women. This is all the more surprising in that a separate but parallel debate on the implications of industrialization for women's welfare has been rumbling on in the pages of the specialist journals for some time [see 38 for a survey of this debate].

In the latter context pessimists have argued that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, women's access to resources was unequal. Market, state, and familial processes of distribution discriminated against them. Moreover these processes were not constant in the face of economic change. Industrialization opened new opportunities but closed others. Large numbers

of women found themselves increasingly detached from the economic mainstream and were left to manage the rump of economic life that remained in the household: primarily the administration of consumption and the management of reproduction. Although these tasks were important, their detachment from productive activities of other kinds and their organization outside the dominant economic relations meant that they ceased to be regarded as proper work, with significant implications for women's status and authority. The extent to which these changes can be documented will be discussed later. The point here is that the general standard of living debate has been largely uninformed by the parallel debate which has women as its focus.

Lindert and Williamson's work has been subject to various criticisms, at one extreme involving heavy empirical artillery, focussed on the question of earnings and unemployment [30, 13], and a general methodological lambasting [30], through to more gentle revisions argued largely from within the same paradigm [7]. Although amendments are beginning to be built into the mainstream, significantly, Neale's root and branch attack remains isolated. For us it provides a good introduction.

The main empirical problem, as Neale emphasizes, is that the Lindert and Williamson index for all workers excludes: all woolcombers, all stockingers, all tailors, all boot and shoe makers, all handloom weavers, all domestic servants and others engaged in personal service, and all women workers. It does, however, include a handful of judges, government lawyers, and so on. It thus omits direct wage data for some 44% of all the labor force in 1841, including almost all workers in the worst paid and most vulnerable sectors. Neale also charges the index with failing to overcome the well known difficulties of constructing representative wage indexes: regional differences, unemployment, short time, overtime, lifetime earnings, and family earnings. "In short, their 'final solution' earnings index does not begin to address those problems that would have to be resolved to convert selected daily and weekly wage rates for male workers in eighteen occupations into a measure of annual family earnings as an adequate measure of the material living standard of *all* workers" [30, p. 113].²

Lindert and Williamson are aware that they have left women out, "Thus far we have taken the orthodox path by focussing solely on adult male purchasing power..." [26, p. 17]. They recognize the empirical fallacies built into such a lopsided view "...Yet questions about the work and earnings of women and children have always been lurking in the wings throughout the standard of living debate" [26, p. 17]. They are prepared to engage in a small "adding-on exercise", which in the article, consists of a table of ratios of female

²In contrast, Neale's own Bath data which is based on 822 observations of *actual* weekly earnings of all laborers employed on the Walcot highway for a period of 42 years, and the reconstruction of lifetime earnings for two laborers in the same period, shows that non-agricultural wage laborers in Bath in 1837 were not materially better off than their equivalents in 1781 [30, p. 114). Cage's evaluation of experiences in Glasgow is even more negative [9].

to male weekly earnings and hourly wage rates from four sources covering three time periods and several rural locations in the eighteenth century, from two sources covering two time periods and several rural locations in the nineteenth century, and from four sources covering three time periods, different industrial groups, and a variety of urban locations in the nineteenth century: "the best available evidence" [26, p. 18]. But even on this weak ground, Lindert and Williamson's rather lame conclusion that working women may have closed distance on unskilled men during 1750-1850, that their "gleanings of data on relative weekly earnings ... hint as much ..." has to be accompanied by the caveat that the evidence on hourly wages warns "that we cannot be sure that there was any upward trend in the true relative values of women's work" [26, p. 19]. Maybe they simply worked longer hours to maintain their relative position. Even the tentative conclusion "that the earnings power of women did not decline. It may have stayed the same, or it may have risen" [26, p. 19] seems to strain credibility given the ambiguity of the underlying numbers.

Unfortunately, perhaps because many of the people working to recover women's economic experience from the past have eschewed the new economic history, this pathetically thin evidence is not readily supplemented from published sources. Neale's survey of earnings in women's occupations in the Gloucestershire woollen industry are a start. His conclusion is clear: "Most women workers, the majority of the workforce, however, experienced either a small rise or a fall in real wages between 1808/15 and 1836/38" [30, p. 117]. In 1808/15 women's wages were on average 55% of men's rates, by 1838 they had fallen to 37%. In Gloucestershire textiles the relative earnings power of women undoubtedly fell.

Similarly from his sample of 140 observations of annual earnings received by domestic servants in Bath between 1730 and 1865, Neale finds "no discernible trend" in money wages of female domestic servants, which probably implies a decline in real wage terms. When other forms of personal service employment are added to domestic service, over 54% of the female workforce is represented, the exclusion of which constitutes a glaring omission from Lindert and Williamson's real wage calculations. Neale concludes that women's earnings declined over the period at least in textiles and domestic service and also in the millinery trades: "It seems unlikely that at any time in the period 1781-1851 that many wives and daughters in laboring families could have contributed more than four or five shillings a week to the maintenance of the household to which they belonged. In good times the most a girl or woman could earn was her subsistence. When food prices were high ... she could barely do that" [30, p. 120]. The implications for women's possible economic independence, even of the conditional kind described by Pamela Sharpe, are negative, perhaps casting light again on the contemporaneous demographic changes. The implications for family income are not so clear cut. But men's gains may not always have offset the falling contributions of wives and daughters.

A question that is logically prior to the discussion of female wages and earnings is that of their employment and earnings opportunities. Research on women's work has made more progress with this issue than the

question of relative wages. Lindert and Williamson and Neale cite evidence of declining participation during industrialization, though they interpret this differently, Neale seeing it in a pessimist light as a demand-side phenomenon leading to under and unemployment, Lindert and Williamson optimistically reading it as voluntary, as "the shadow price of women's time rose faster than the observed wage rate" [26, p. 19]. Lindert and Williamson reject the pessimist position on the grounds that there were no institutions (except perhaps protective labor legislation after 1833) which could have excluded women from employment.

Discussion of trends in women's economic opportunities has been central to the debate about whether or not industrialization led to an improvement or deterioration in women's lives. The optimists see industrialization as widening women's opportunities, promoting their economic independence, and emancipating them from the patriarchy of the family. The pessimists argue that capitalist industrialization reduced women's economic options and left them increasingly dependent on men. Confusion is reflected in the widespread citation of two well-known articles which argue for opposing trends without recognition of the conflict. It is difficult to agree with Eric Richards that in the long perspective of British economic development there was "a substantial diminution" of the economic role of women [33, p. 337], and with Neil McKendrick that while "the small earnings of women and children had made their modest contribution to the family budget for centuries... with the industrial revolution their earnings became central to the domestic economy ... they made a significantly larger contribution [and] they made it to a significantly larger number of families " [27]. Moreover although Lindert and Williamson are at a loss to identify institutions which excluded women from the labor market in the nineteenth century, other authors have detailed the sex-specific exclusionary consequences (sometimes unintended according to this author [21]) of early trade union activity, the ideology of the family wage, employers' adherence to traditional norms of what was suitable work for women, increased tensions between motherhood and economic activity, and the implications of developing ideas of respectability for sex segregation at work [3, 4, 6, 16, 18, 19, 23, 29, 42].

Persistent differences of opinion on trends in women's economic opportunities derive from different emphases. The optimists vision is heavily influenced by the growth of factory employment, especially women's employment in textiles and pottery. As late as 1850 only one percent of the population of Britain was working in factories. Pottery, which provides almost all of McKendrick's illustrations, represented less than one half of one percent of female employment in 1851. Although industrialization generated significant growth in textile factory jobs for women, at the same time it destroyed a stable by-employment for women in domestic spinning. Even if we assume that the volume of employment in the factories was the same as the employment when the industry was domestically organized, it was undoubtedly concentrated on fewer workers. Textile workers in the early factories worked long hours while underemployment of rural labor was an acknowledged source of rural poverty [5]. Moreover, in the medium term at least, increases in productivity associated with the mechanization of spinning

may well have offset increases in output implying reduced employment.³ As Pamela Sharpe notes with respect to lacemaking, women's employment in domestic industry has remained invisible to mainstream economic history, and so the employment losses implied by the decline of these trades has been neglected. Yet they must stand as a substantial offset to the employment gains in the factory system.

The pessimists have emphasized declining employment opportunities for women in agriculture, job losses linked to changes in cropping patterns and land use more generally, and to increasing farm size [2, 37]. They have also made significant use of the early censuses to try to establish aggregate trends. From 1840 on a picture of declining opportunities is probably established [4, 19, 23, 33], and is supported by recent local studies [12, 42]. But reliance on the early censuses forces the analysis forward into the nineteenth century, missing out on the years traditionally associated with the industrial revolution. Moreover, the censuses themselves have been criticized for underestimating the numbers of working wives, overreporting domestic servants, and possibly distorting the industrial distribution of women workers [15, but see also 12, 23]. To undermine the pessimists position the underreporting would not only have to be significant but would also have to increase through time to offset the downward trend.

The importance of taking account of both changes in women's employment opportunities and their relative earnings is illustrated in Table 1. The table summarizes women's contributions to family incomes in a substantial subsample of household budgets compiled as part of an ongoing research project on the standard of living of British families during industrialization [17]. The evidence suggests that although wife's earnings as a percentage of husband's earnings was increasing in households where wives worked, such households declined as a percentage of all households through the years traditionally associated with industrialization, whereas the percentage of households in which wives did not work for wages or earn through self-employment increased. The increasing weight of households with financially dependent wives reduces wife's earnings as a percentage of husband's earnings for the sample as a whole, but would be misleading if looked at in isolation from the trends in women's employment. Whether the general decline in female contributions offsets the gains in male earnings found by the standard of living optimists remains to be seen.

³ Catling's estimates of productivity using Crompton's original mule, the power assisted mules of 1795, and the self actors which were appearing in large numbers in the 1830s, and data on imports of raw cotton, imply a decline in the total number of operative hours required through the 1790s followed by a recovery in the first quarter of the nineteenth century though not back to the level of the 1780s [8].

Table 1. Women's earnings and employment 1787-1863

<u>Year</u>	<u>Wife's earnings as % husband's earnings</u>		<u>% women not earning</u>	<u>Sample size</u>
	<u>All households</u>	<u>Women working</u>		
1787	10.34	10.34	0	6
1788	6.12	12.24	50	6
1789	14.38	17.51	18	56
1790	11.57	14.24	19	32
1791	4.06	6.09	33	6
1793	14.34	39.44	64	11
1794	5.74	8.04	29	7
1795	12.12	21.97	45	29
1796	12.14	14.16	14	7
1824	0.00	0.00	100	4
1834	32.55	45.15	28	43
1837	24.06	32.31	26	47
1838	5.08	35.35	86	28
1840	4.20	18.90	78	9
1841	3.43	22.30	84	26
1842	2.64	21.12	88	24
1843	23.17	28.96	20	5
1844	26.56	33.64	21	19
1863	6.63	29.17	73	88
1787-96	12.10	16.70	28	160
1834-38	22.70	38.30	41	118
1840-44	9.80	29.10	66	83
1863	6.60	29.00	73	88

Source: The information is extracted from an extensive data base of household budgets compiled as part of a project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, award number A89093, S893065, F567B.

To summarize, I do not share Janet Thomas's view that "histories of women on the grand scale, whether optimistic or pessimistic, are amazingly premature when the available documentation is so sketchy" [38, p. 547]. But much work remains to be done on women's employment gains and losses by sector, paying careful attention to domestic industry and pushing backwards into the eighteenth century. On the basis of the evidence to date the pessimists appear to have the edge. The conviction that more doors were closing than were opening for women is consistent with the contemporary belief that lack of earnings opportunities for women was a major source of poverty. The pessimists also explicitly acknowledge that their concern is with the economic opportunities facing women and not prospects for wage employment alone. Opportunities for self employment shrivelled with

industrialization and the development of capitalist agriculture [20, 37]. Taking this into account strengthens the pessimist case.

Economic historians have made significant progress in recovering women's past experience. Working out the implications of gendered experience has been much less successful. To the extent that women figure in the mainstream texts they have been "added on" with unsatisfactory implications. From "lurking in the wings" women have been graduated to bit parts. Approaches which seem to assign *a priori* importance to women's economic roles, for example the protoindustrial school, tend to marginalize women's contribution by locating it within the family economy and so losing sight of women as potentially independent historical agents. And yet the implications of women's experience for the mainstream are considerable, as I hope this brief review of three well-known debates has demonstrated. Finally, the revisionist perspective itself sets up demands for yet more work to clarify and elaborate the economic experience of women in the past. Introduced as key players, women will force important changes in the script, but if these amendments are to be developed, we must be sure of our female characters and the roles that they performed.

References

1. Sally Alexander, "Women's Work in Nineteenth Century London 1820 - 1850," in Juliet Mitchell and Ann Oakley, eds., *The Rights and Wrongs of Women* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1976).
2. Robert C. Allen, "The Growth of Labor Productivity in Early Modern English Agriculture," *Explorations in Economic History*, 25 (April 1988), 117-46.
3. Harold Benenson, "The 'Family Wage' and Working Women's Consciousness in Britain," *Politics and Society*, (Spring 1991), forthcoming.
4. Dianne C. Betts, "Women and Work: Industrial Segregation in England and Wales, 1851-1901," Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University Working Paper (1991).
5. George Boyer, *An Economic History of the English Poor Law: 1750-1850* (Cambridge, 1990).
6. Joanna Brenner and Maria Ramas, "Rethinking Women's Oppression," *New Left Review*, 144 (1984), 33-71.
7. John C. Brown, "The Condition of England and the Standard of Living: Cotton Textiles in the Northwest, 1806-1850," *Journal of Economic History*, 50 (September 1990), 591-614.
8. H. Catling, *The Spinning Mule*, (Newton Abbot, 1970).
9. R. A. Cage, "The Standard of Living Debate: Glasgow, 1800-1850," *Journal of Economic History*, 43 (March 1983), 175-182.
10. Alice Clark, *Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1967).
11. L.A. Clarkson, *Protoindustrialization: The First Phase of Industrialization?* (London, 1985).
12. Peter Earle, "The Female Labor Market in London in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries," *Economic History Review*, 42 (August 1989), 328 -54.
13. Charles H. Feinstein, "The Rise and Fall of the Williamson Curve," *Journal of Economic History*, 48 (September 1988), 699-729.

14. John R. Gillis, *For Better, For Worse: British Marriages 1600 to the Present* (Oxford, 1985).
15. Edward Higgs, "Women, Occupations and Work in the Nineteenth-Century Censuses," *History Workshop*, 23 (1987), 59-80.
16. Heidi I. Hartmann, "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union," *Capital and Class*, 8 (Summer 1979), 1-33.
17. Sara Horrell and Jane Humphries, "Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Household Budgets," Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge Mimeo (1991).
18. Jane Humphries, "Protective Legislation, The Capitalist State, and Working Class Men: The Case of the 1842 Mines Regulation Act," *Feminist Review*, 7 (Spring 1981), 1-33.
19. _____, "'The Most free From Objection'... The Sexual Division of Labor and Women's Work in Nineteenth Century England," *Journal of Economic History*, 47 (December 1987), 929-50.
20. _____, "Enclosures, Common Rights and Women: The Proletarianization of Families in Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Britain," *Journal of Economic History*, 50 (March 1990), 17-42.
21. _____, Review of Harriet Bradley, *Men's Work, Women's Work*, *Sociology*, 24 (August 1990).
22. Angela John, *By the sweat of their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal Mines* (London, 1980).
23. Ellen Jordan, "The Exclusion of Women from Industry in Nineteenth-Century Britain", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31 (1989), 309-26.
24. Ann Kussmaul, *A General View of the Rural Economy of England, 1538-1840* (Cambridge, 1990).
25. David Levine, *Family Formation in an Age of Nascent Capitalism* (New York, 1977).
26. Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "English Workers' Living Standards during the Industrial Revolution: A New Look," *Economic History Review*, 36, (February 1983), 1-25.
27. Neil McKendrick, "Home Demand and Economic Growth: A New View of the Role of Women and Children in the Industrial Revolution," in N. McKendrick, ed., *Historical Perspectives in English Thought and Society in Honour of J.H. Plumb* (London, 1974).
28. Robert W. Malcolmson, *Life and Labor in England. 1700-1780* (New York, 1981).
29. M. Murray, "Property and 'Patriarchy' in English History," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 2 (1989), 303-27.
30. R.S. Neale, *Writing Marxist History* (Oxford, 1985).
31. Martha Olney, "Fertility and the Standard of Living in Early Modern England: In Consideration of Wrigley and Schofield," *Journal of Economic History*, 43 (March 1983), 71-77.
32. Ivy Pinchbeck, *Women Workers in the Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1969).
33. Eric Richards, "Women in the British Economy since about 1700: An Interpretation," *History*, 59 (1974), 337-47.
34. Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York).
35. R.S. Schofield, "English Marriage Patterns Revisited," *Journal of Family History*, 10 (Spring 1985), 2-20.

36. Pamela Sharpe, "Literally Spinsters: A New Interpretation of Local Economy and Demography in Colyton in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Economic History Review*, 44 (February 1991), 46-65.
37. Keith Snell, *Annals of the Laboring Poor: Social Change and Agrarian England 1660-1900* (Cambridge, 1985).
38. Janet Thomas, "Women and Capitalism: Oppression or Emancipation?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 30 (1988), 534-49.
39. N.L. Tranter, *Population and Society, 1750-1940* (London, 1985).
40. Sylvia Walby, *Patriarchy at Work* (Cambridge, 1986).
41. Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality?* (Boston, 1985).
42. S. Wright, "'Holding Up Half the Sky': Women and their Occupations in Eighteenth-Century Ludlow," *Midland History*, 14 (1989), 53-74.
43. E.A. Wrigley, and R.S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541-1871. A Reconstruction* (London, 1981).